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V.  Real-World Examples, Handy How-to’s and Sample Screen Shots 
Sara Anne Hook, M.B.A., J.D.  
[N.B.:  Case summaries retrieved from the K&L Gates database are designated as KLG.  Case 
summaries retrieved from the Kroll Ontrack database are designated as KO. Case summaries 
from Exterro are designated EX.  An effort has been made to select a variety of recent cases, 
particularly cases from 2014-2017, as appropriate to each type of electronic evidence.  Note that 
the most recent cases were very quickly being decided by applying the 2015 amendments to the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.] 
 It is quite interesting to search for the technologies and tools mentioned in Sections B. 
through K and note how the cases about them ebb and flow throughout the years.  For example, 
some of the technologies are rarely mentioned in more recent case summaries in the K&L Gates 
and Kroll Ontrack databases, but cases about them were prominent beforehand.  Lawyers are 
encouraged to consult the websites of K&L Gates (https://www.ediscoverylaw.com/, accessed 
10/13/17), Kroll Ontrack (https://www.krollontrack.com/, accessed 10/13/17), Exterro 
(https://www.exterro.com/, accessed 10/13/17) and Sensei Enterprises, Inc. 
(https://senseient.com/, accessed 10/13/17) for the latest information, guidance and resources 
about electronic discovery issues and challenges, particularly with social media.  
A. Preservation, Spoliation and Authentication Obstacles 
 There are a number of excellent sources for information on preservation, spoliation and 
authentication of social media as evidence.  A presentation on social media as evidence at the 
ABA Annual Meeting in 2013 provides a number of information about authentication: 
Authentication.  FRE 901 establishes the requirements for authentication or 
identification as a condition precedent to the admissibility of non-testimonial evidence.  
FRE 901(b) gives examples of how authentication can be accomplished.  Generally, the 
proponent of the internet printout must provide testimony by live witness or affidavit that 
the printout is what it purports to be.  See In re Carrsow-Franklin, 456 B.R. 753, 756-57 
(Bankr.D.S.C. 2011) (noting that blogs are not self-authenticating and rejecting blog 
evidence due to failure to present authentication testimony) and cases cited there.  The 
Lorraine case gives an excellent discussion of how Rule FRE 901 works with FRE 104 
and the necessity for the court to decide authentication as a preliminary question.  
However, if the evidence is not relevant to begin with, it cannot be authenticated because 
it cannot meet the requirements under FRE 104 and 401.    
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These evidentiary rules do not appear to be consistently applied between the criminal and 
civil contexts.  Some state criminal courts appear to fail to apply or misapply the 
evidentiary rules.  For example, in Griffin v. State, 419 Md. 343, 19 A.3d 415 (Md. Ct. 
App. 2011), the court overturned conviction for felonies including second-degree murder 
because MySpace pages of defendant’s girlfriend on which there were threats (“snitches 
get stitches”) against a key witness lacked a proper foundation as they were not properly 
authenticated.  The court analyzed a Maryland rule of evidence that was, in part, similar 
to FRE 901 and looked at decisions in other states.  The court held that the prosecutor’s 
effort to authenticate through the police investigator rather than the girlfriend, who 
testified at trial, was insufficient.  The court noted that the prosecution could also have 
searched the computer of the person who allegedly created the profile and the posting or 
sought information from the social media website.  The Griffin opinion appears to be 
based more on the court’s skepticism about admitting internet evidence in general.  The 
court focused on the fact that the evidence may have been created by someone other than 
its putative creator, even in the absence of any evidence that this in fact happened, and 
then excluded the evidence on the grounds that there was inaccurate authentication.  The 
reasoning in Griffin conflicts with FRE 104 and 901 and Lorraine in which Judge Grimm 
stated that authentication “as a condition precedent to admissibility is satisfied by 
evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent 
claims . . . This is not a particularly high barrier to overcome . . . as [a] party seeking to 
admit an exhibit need only make a prima facie showing that it is what he or she claims it 
to be . . . [and] ‘[t]he court need not find that the evidence is necessarily what the 
proponent claims, but only that there is sufficient evidence that the jury might ultimately 
do so.’”  241 F.R.D. at 541–42 (internal citation omitted).  
In People v. Clevenstine, 68 A.D.3d 1448, 891 N.Y.S.2d 511 (2009), the court held that 
MySpace messages were properly admitted in a rape case.  Defendant asserted that 
someone else accessed his account and posted the messages.  Both victims testified that 
they had engaged in MySpace instant messaging with defendant about sexual activities, a 
police investigator retrieved the messages from the hard drive of the computer of the 
victims, and a MySpace employee testified that the messages had been between the 
victims and users of accounts created by the defendant.  The court applied New York 
case law on authentication without any reference to evidentiary rules. [Gary L. Beaver, 
Steven Brower, Amy Longo, Cecil A. Lynn, III, & Mark Romance, Social Media 
Evidence – How to Find It and How to Use It, ABA Annual Meeting, Aug. 8-12, 2013, at 
20-21.] 
Additional information is provided on identification of parties using social media, relevant, 
hearsay and unfair prejudice. [Id. at 21-22.]  The authors also offer a number of helpful 
recommendations for the discovery of social media evidence.  Discovery requests/subpoenas for 
social media evidence should be drawn narrowly. (This is especially important given the 2015 
amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.) 
• Tie your discovery requests to information already in hand that shows that the request is 
seeking evidence that likely exists and, therefore, is not a fishing expedition.  
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• Compulsion efforts are better targeted at the users of social media, not at the social media 
providers. 
• If you have evidence that the producing party has improperly withheld evidence, go to 
the court for sanctions and/or for more social media discovery. 
• Consider closely who “owns” the social media link. You may have more than one 
potential discovery target.   
• In camera review by the court may be needed.  
• If the request is too broad, the court may limit it or deny it altogether. (Be sure to review 
the 2015 amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.) [Id. at 15-19.] 
Nelson and Simek provide some excellent suggestions for dealing with social media as 
evidence, including preservation and authentication. [Sharon D. Nelson & John W. Simek, Social 
Media: Preservation, Harvesting and Authentication, Sensei Enterprises, Inc, 2014, 
https://senseient.com/articles/social-media-preservation-harvesting-and-authentication/, accessed 
10/13/17.]   
A recent article by Foster discusses the admissibility of social media evidence in federal 
courts.  [Angela Foster, Admissibility of Social Media Evidence in Federal Courts:  Is It What It 
Purports to Be? The Computer & Internet Lawyer, June 2016, pp. 13-16.]  Noting that the 
admissibility of social media evidence as increasingly become a highly litigated issue, Foster 
begins her article by explaining why merely accessing social media is not enough to authenticate 
is. [Id. at 13-14.]  She then describes why evidence from fake social media accounts may be 
admissible, citing U.S. v. Gaston (Instagram) and U.S. v. Meregildo (Facebook). [Id. at 14-15.] 
She discusses why caution is needed when thinking about whether to delete social media 
evidence, citing Gatto v. United Air Lines, Inc. (Facebook). [Id. at 15-16.] It is important to note 
that Gatto was decided in 2013, which pre-dates the 2015 amendments to the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure.  As she summarizes,  
Because courts have different holdings regarding the authenticity and admission of social 
media evidence, attorneys must know their jurisdiction.  Moreover, proper authentication 
differs based on the purpose and context of the evidence being presented.  Accordingly, 
careful consideration must be given to requirements needed to properly authenticate 
social media evidence before the trial.  The Federal Rules of Evidence provides some 
guidance on how to authenticate evidence.  Specifically, Federal Rules 901(b) and 902 
may be applied to social media evidence. [Id. at 16.] 
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Interestingly, amendments to the Federal Rules of Evidence, specifically Rules 803, Rule 
902(13) and 902(14) are being considered and, if approved, would become effective on 
December 1, 2017.  
 If you really want to understand each type of electronic evidence, how it is generated, by 
which software and devices, how to retrieve it and preserve it and how to uncover evidence that 
has been hidden or tampered with, please read Electronically Stored Information:  The Complete 
Guide to Management, Understanding, Acquisition, Storage, Search, and Retrieval, 2nd ed.  
[David R. Matthews, Electronically Stored Information:  The Complete Guide to Management, 
Understanding, Acquisition, Storage, Search, and Retrieval, 2nd ed.  CRC Press, 2016.]  I use it 
as one of my textbooks in the semester-long course I teach on electronic discovery, which is part 
of the legal informatics certificate offered by the Indiana University School of Informatics and 
Computing at IUPUI.  You will enjoy the history of how each new technology developed, from 
analog to digital, the electronic discovery implications of this technology and the clear 
explanations for how computing programming works, down to the zeros and ones of binary 
computer code.   
 A very thorough article about common problems with electronic discovery and suggested 
solutions is provided by Hernandez.  [Andres Hernandez, Common Problems With E-Discovery 
and Their Solutions. The Federal Lawyer, Sept. 2016, pp. 63-68.]  Among the issues that he 
highlights and provides recommendations for are: 
• There’s just too much data 
• Data is everywhere 
• Data collection – including the issues with self-collection 
• Not all data is created equal 
• What to do if you know exactly what you are looking for, such as using metadata analysis 
and textual analytics 
• What to do if you are trying to fill in knowledge gaps, including the importance of using 
keywords intelligently 
• What to do if you are still trying to understand your case, including using concept-
clustering, using a word frequency hit count or using TAR (Technology-Assisted 
Review) 
• Dealing with the expense of the process, with a list of URLs for vendors offering cost-
effective solutions 
• Falling into the trap of “scope creep” 
• Not starting the e-discovery process early enough 
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• E-discovery approached as a project, with the recommendation to help clients set up 
better information governance programs (a potential practice-building opportunity for 
law firms?) 
• When your analytics are not good enough 
• Lack of convergence 
• Unwillingness to work cooperatively with opposing parties and their lawyers 
• Difficulty recovering the costs of e-discovery 
• Laws are complex and constantly changing 
• It is almost impossible to compare e-discovery providers 
• Technological incompetence – see Rule 1.1 and Section VI. of this seminar manual 
• Data is sorely mismanaged  
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B. Facebook, Twitter, LinkedIn and Tumblr  
• Rhone v. Schneider Nat'l Carriers, Inc., 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53346 (E.D. Mo. Apr. 
21, 2016). 
(Facebook, motion to compel, social media, burdensome, overbroad) 
 
In this personal injury case, the defendants moved to compel the plaintiff to produce her 
“Download Your Info” report from Facebook, from the date of the accident to the 
present. The plaintiff objected that the request, arguing that it was overbroad as found in 
FRCP 26(b)(1), and moot because she already submitted hundreds of pages of Facebook 
postings. The court found that the plaintiff did not comply with the discovery request, 
since the “[p]laintiff did not initially disclose the existence of any social media accounts,” 
and ordered the plaintiff to produce the requested information. In reaching its decision, 
the court noted the insufficiency of the plaintiff’s objection, stating, “[a]lthough Plaintiff 
maintains that [defendant’s] request is overbroad and asserts that such a production 
would be unduly burdensome, Plaintiff does not explain how it is overbroad or 
burdensome.” [KO] 
 
• Thurmond v. Bowman, 2016 WL 1295957 (W.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2016). 
(Social media, relevance, spoliation) 
In this Fair Housing Act case, the defendants motioned for sanctions against the plaintiff 
for deleting Facebook posts. The plaintiff argued that the posts were not deleted 
intentionally, but rather they were “hidden” from public view. The plaintiff produced a 
printed set of Facebook posts, which supplied most of the missing posts, but three posts 
remained missing. The court found that these posts, because of their nature (photographs 
of the plaintiff’s children, supplied as “screen shots” by the defendants), were not 
relevant to the case. In addition, rather than relying on public privacy settings, the court 
noted that the defendants could have requested the information through discovery. The 
court denied the defendants’ motion, stating that the claim that every social media post is 
relevant “sweeps far too broadly.” However, because the plaintiff did change privacy 
settings in violation of a court order to maintain the “status quo” of social media 
accounts, the plaintiff was warned that further conduct in this manner could result in 
sanctions. [KO] 
 
• Keller v. National Farmers Union Property & Cas. Co., 2013 WL 27731 (D. Mont. Jan. 
2, 2013). 
(Motion to compel, production, social networking, social network, expectation of 
privacy) 
 
In this insurance dispute, the defendant insurance company moved for an order 
compelling the plaintiffs to respond to discovery requests for the production of their 
social network content, “including, but not limited to, Facebook, Myspace, Twitter, 
LinkedIn, LiveJournal, Tagged, Meetup, myLife, Instagram and MeetMe,” as well as pre-
accident medical records. As to the social network content, plaintiffs objected that the 
request was “overly burdensome and meant to harass . . . insureds.” In response, the 
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defendant cited Romano v. Steelcase, in which the court ruled that social networking 
content is often relevant in determining whether a plaintiff is actually injured, and that a 
plaintiff has no legitimate expectation of privacy in those communications. However, the 
court, citing Tompkins v. Detroit Metropolitan Airport, ruled that the defendant must 
make a threshold showing that publicly available information on social networking sites 
undermines the plaintiffs’ claims, so as to guard against the “proverbial fishing 
expedition.” The court determined that the defendant had not made this requisite 
threshold showing, and is thus not entitled to “delve carte blanche” into the nonpublic 
sections of the plaintiffs’ social networking accounts. [KO] 
 
• People v. Harris, 2011NY080152 (NY Crim. Ct. New York Co. June 30, 2012). 
(Twitter, tweets, social media, Stored Communications Act, standing, third party 
respondent, motion to quash, subpoena, metadata, posts) 
 
In this criminal matter arising out of the Occupy Wall Street protests, the court reviewed 
Twitter’s motion to quash a subpoena, which ordered the production of tweets and 
pertinent metadata from a user’s account. The threshold determination required an 
assessment of whether the criminal defendant or the third party respondent (Twitter) had 
standing to quash the subpoena. In line with the court’s previous ruling on this matter, the 
court pointed to Twitter’s terms and policy, holding that Twitter—not the criminal 
defendant—had standing to challenge the subpoena. Addressing Twitter’s contention that 
responding to numerous subpoenas would result in an undue burden (and thus barred by 
the SCA), the court held that because all third party respondents bear this burden, the 
argument “cannot be used to create standing for a defendant where none exists.” Further, 
the court noted that “it does not take much to search and provide the data to the court.” 
The court found that Twitter’s services fall within the statutory definition of both an 
Electronic Communication Service (ECS) (generally, a communication service) and a 
Remote Communication Service (RCS) (generally, a storage service for substantive posts 
and metadata produced by the chat service). Equating public tweets to yelling on the 
street, the court further determined that the posts were not “private” and thus not outside 
of the scope of the SCA. Ultimately, the court largely denied Twitter’s motion to quash 
the subpoena, holding that the prosecutor must obtain a search warrant for tweets within 
180 days of the decision date to comply with the SCA. [KO] 
 
• Lemon Juice v. Twitter, Inc., No. 502898/14, 2014 WL 4287049 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Aug. 29, 
2014). 
(Twitter subscriber information sufficient to identify the individual(s) who owned or 
operated particular Twitter account and logged into or "tweeted" on the account) 
 
Where unknown person created Twitter account in plaintiff’s name and in violation of 
criminal court's order took photo of child victim in court testifying against her tormentor 
and posted it to Twitter account, court ruled that plaintiff had met his burden of 
demonstrating a meritorious claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress and that 
the discovery sought from Twitter was needed in order to identify who should be named 
as a defendant, and that anonymous Twitter account creator’s behavior constituted an 
actionable tort and was not speech covered by First Amendment protection such that 
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anonymity of creator had to yield to plaintiff’s need to redress the actionable wrong 
perpetrated against him; court directed Twitter to disclose basic subscriber information, 
records, internet protocol addresses and other similar information sufficient to identify 
owner of the bogus Twitter account and to preserve certain evidence. [KLG] 
 
• Wilson v. Indiana No. 45A03-1409-CR-317, 2015 WL 1963860 (Ind. Ct. App. Apr. 30, 
2015). – NOTE:  Indiana case. 
(Twitter) 
 
In a criminal matter, the court said that Twitter messages could be authenticated under 
Indiana Rules of Evidence Rule 901(b) by, for example, “(1) Testimony of a Witness 
with Knowledge” and by “(4) Distinctive Characteristics and the Like” and these 
examples were satisfied where a witness testified that she had communicated with the 
defendant on Twitter via the account in question and testified that the account contained 
both pictures of the defendant and references to activities that were sufficient to indicate 
that the posts had been authored by the defendant. [KLG] 
 
• Del Gallo v. City of New York, 997 N.Y.S.2d 98 (Table) (N.Y. Sup. Ct.2014). 
(Social media contents (e.g., LinkedIn)) 
 
Addressing request for discovery of Plaintiff’s social media contents, specifically 
LinkedIn, court indicated that “[t]o warrant such discovery, ‘defendants must establish a 
factual predicate for their request by identifying relevant information in plaintiff’s [social 
media] account -- that is, information that contradicts or conflicts with plaintiff’s alleged 
restrictions, disabilities, and losses, and other claims’” and, although it acknowledged 
that Defendants could obtain information pertinent to Plaintiff’s communications with 
recruiters related to job offers and related inquiries, indicated that Defendants had not 
shown that they were entitled to Plaintiff’s communications with former colleagues about 
her condition or to the other materials on LinkedIn. [KLG] 
 
• Brown v. Ferguson, No. 4:15CV00831 ERW, 2017 WL 386544 (E.D. Mo. Jan. 27, 
2017). 
(Social Media/social network (Facebook, etc.)) 
 
Court clarified discoverability of relevant social media content but indicated that 
disclosure of passwords was not required and not permitted by the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure. [KLG] 
 
• Gordon v. T.G.R. Logistics, Inc., No. 16-cv-00238-NDF, 2017 WL 1947537 (D. Wy. 
May 10, 2017). 
(Social media (Facebook)) 
 
In this personal injury case, Defendant requested production of Plaintiff’s entire 
“Facebook account history” for her two accounts (and later limited the relevant 
timeframe of the request to information from three years prior to the accident through the 
present). In response, Plaintiff produced information that referenced the at-issue auto 
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accident or her injuries and also provided information identified by a set of keywords set 
forth by Defendant. She objected to further production based on a lack of relevance, 
undue burden, and invasion of privacy. The court granted Defendant’s subsequent motion 
to compel, but imposed significant limits on the scope of production. [KLG] 
 
• Zamora v. Stellar Mgmt. Grp., Inc., 3:16-05028-CV-RK, 2017 WL 1362688 (W.D. Mo., 
Mar. 11, 2017).  
(ESI from cellular phones, Facebook) 
Where Plaintiff in an employment litigation failed to preserve a potentially relevant 
Facebook post, deleted her work phone before returning it and failed to preserve 
information contained on numerous other phones (e.g., because they were lost, etc.), 
court found that “Plaintiff cannot be relied on to disclose all relevant communications” 
and granted motion to allow access to the mirror image of a phone belonging to a former 
employee and co-worker of the plaintiff and to allow defendant to subpoena the former 
employee to produce a second phone for inspection and ordered production of Plaintiff’s 
current work phone, to be reviewed by a Special Master for potentially relevant 
communications, with the cost of the Special Master to be split between the parties ; court 
found request for dismissal or an adverse inference was premature. [KLG] 
 
• Cohn v. Guaranteed Rate, Inc., No. 1:14-cv-9369, 2016 WL 7157358 (N.D. Ill. Dec 8, 
2016). 
(Emails (Gmail, but also LinkedIn)) 
 
Defendant sought production of Plaintiff’s emails, imposition of spoliation sanctions, and 
an extension of the discovery deadline. Plaintiff previously agreed to produce responsive 
documents from her Gmail and LinkedIn account, but failed to do so (later third party 
productions contained emails sent from her Gmail account). Plaintiff admitted she deleted 
emails from her Gmail account at various times, and evidence showed she instructed a 
subordinate to start using their personal email addresses and to delete various emails. The 
court found (i) a duty to preserve existed as of at least November 30, 2013, (ii) that 
Plaintiff breached that duty when she deleted emails, and (iii) there was a strong 
inference that the emails would have been unfavorable to Plaintiff because (iv) she 
deleted the emails in bad faith (to admittedly ‘hide’ the information). The court denied 
Defendant’s motion for equitable relief, but allowed Defendant’s alternate request that 
Plaintiff must provide full access to her Gmail account (details to be addressed in a meet-
and-confer). [KLG] 
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C. Emails (Work-Related and Personal) 
It is very clear that, absent some narrow exceptions, email messages are electronically 
stored information (ESI) that is discoverable and admissible in court.  Indeed, email messages 
were the heart of the evidence in the Zubulake v. UBS Warburg case, the very foundation of 
electronic discovery. However, email as evidence continues to be the subject of dispute in many 
e-discovery cases, particularly when a party is using a personal device or a personal email.  The 
issue of emails sent via a private server and the blending of personal, work-related and even 
classified communications haunted former Secretary of State Clinton’s campaign for President 
and caused such consternation that Congress proposed H.R.3743 Securing Every Relevant and 
Vital Electronic Record Act of 2015 or the SERVER Act, which would prohibit: 
the Secretary of a cabinet-level executive department from maintaining a private email 
server to conduct official government business. The Inspector General of each such 
department shall ensure compliance with such prohibition.  A Secretary who violates 
such prohibition is subject to a fine and/or prison term and shall forfeit his or her office 
and be disqualified from holding any U.S. government office. [Summary:  H.R. 3743, 
114th Congress (2015-2016).] 
See also H.Res.477 - Expressing the sense of the House of Representatives that a special 
counsel should be appointed by the Attorney General or his designee to investigate 
misconduct by former Attorney General Loretta Lynch and former Federal Bureau of 
Investigation Director James B. Comey with regard to the investigation of former 
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton for mishandling of classified data and use of an 
unauthorized email server. [Summary:  H.Res. 477, 115th Congress (2017-2018).] 
Congress and the administration continued to grapple with other issues related to email 
during 2015-2016.  As reported by Moyer in March 2016, 
Congressional support for the modernization legislation called the Email Privacy Act has 
grown since its introduction several years ago.  More than 300 House members today are 
co-sponsors of the measure, a number greater than any other bill pending in the House of 
Representatives and a reflection of the breadth of bipartisan support for privacy 
protection.   
Introduced in the House by Rep. Kevin Yoder (R-Kan.) and in the Senate by Patrick 
Leahy (R-Vt.), the Email Privacy Act (H.R. 699 and S. 356) would change the 
framework for law enforcement access to email (and texts and other electronic content) 
housed with Internet service providers, like Google and Yahoo, and bring the statute in 
line with the Sixth Circuit’s opinion in United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266 (6th Cir. 
2010), which requires the government to obtain a warrant to access emails, regardless of 
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their age. [Bruce Moyer, You’ve Got Mail…and a Warrant for Its Disclosure, The 
Federal Lawyer 6-7 (Mar. 2016).] 
A second bill is H.R.4709, the Unsubscribe From All Act of 2016.  Per the Summary,  
This bill amends the CAN-SPAM Act of 2003 to require commercial email messages to 
contain an "unsubscribe from all" option that recipients may select, with not more than 
one additional action required by the recipient, to send a reply requesting not to receive 
future emails from the sender.  
A commercial email message must remain capable of receiving such unsubscribe replies 
for at least 30 days after the transmission of the original message. [Summary:  H.R. 4709, 
114th Congress (2015-2016).] 
The author notes that the last time Congress updated email privacy laws was in 1986 when it 
established the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA), which was intended to protect 
wire, oral and electronic communications when those communications were being made, were in 
transit and when stored on computers and includes email, telephone conversations and data 
stored electronically. [Id. at 6.]  However, he observes that these distinctions and the motivation 
for the ECPA have been outpaced by technology.  [Id.] As an example, he indicates that the 
ECPA permits the government to access email messages without a warrant if they are stored by 
the service provider for more than 180 days, but a court-imposed warrant must be secured for 
email messages that are stored for fewer than 180 days, a distinction that is quite outdated. [Id.] 
As part of his article, the author includes concerns expressed by the Department of Justice (DOJ) 
and various federal civil enforcement agencies, such as the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC). [Id. at 6-7.]  Additional bills have been introduced in Congress during 2017 that attempt 
to balance consumer privacy interests versus the need for law enforcement to have access to 
personal information.  For example, S.1654 Email Privacy Act would “amend title 18, United 
States Code, to update the privacy protections for electronic communications information that is 
stored by third-party service providers in order to protect consumer privacy interests while 
meeting law enforcement needs, and for other purposes.” [Summary:  S.1654 Email Privacy Act, 
115th Congress (2017-2018), see also H.R.. 387.] 
On the other hand, email continues to be a rich repository of potentially relevant 
evidence.  It is still the primary means of communication in many companies, non-profit 
organizations and government agencies.  However, the issues with email as ESI become even 
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more complicated in an increasingly BYOD (Bring Your Own Device) environment, where 
employees are expected to be “on the clock” 24/7 and to use their personal systems and devices 
to do this.  Nelson and Simek are especially blunt about the risks that employees pose in the 
workplace, especially in a BYOD environment, including the danger of compromising an 
electronic discovery process.  [Sharon D. Nelson & John W. Simek, Five Cybersecurity Worries 
to Give You the Willies, Sensei Enterprises (2016), http://senseient.com/wp-
content/uploads/Five-Cybersecurity-Worries-to-Give-You-the-Willies.pdf, accessed 10/16/17.]   
Employees are by nature rogues.  In every study that’s been made, they will ignore 
policies (assuming they exist) in order to do what they want to do.  This often means that 
they bring their own devices (BYOD) which may be infected when they connect to your 
network.  They may also bring their own network (BYON) or bring their own cloud 
(BYOC).  Certainly your policies should disallow these practices (in our judgment) or at 
least manage the risks by controlling what it is done by a combination of polices and 
technologies.   
Oh, and they steal your data or leave it on flash drives, their home devices, etc.  This 
means you have “dark data” – data you don’t know about and over which you have no 
control.  This means you may miss data required in discovery because you don’t know it 
exists.  Your data may not be protected in compliance with federal or state laws and 
regulations.  Once again, a combination of policies and technology should be in place to 
prevent these issues.  [Id. at 1-2.] 
 A few recent cases involving disputes about email are as follows: 
• FiTeq Inc. v. Venture Corp., 2016 WL 1701794 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 28, 2016). 
(Prejudice, Rule 37, spoliation, sanctions, emails) 
 
In this contract law case, the plaintiff moved for sanctions against the defendant for 
failing to produce emails related to the litigation. Namely, the plaintiff asked the court to 
grant a Motion in Limine to allow a jury instruction for spoliation of evidence. The 
defendant argued that the recently amended FRCP 37(e) only allows sanctions when the 
evidence “cannot be restored or replaced through additional discovery,” and the plaintiff 
never sought additional discovery. Secondly, the defendant argued that FRCP 37(e) 
requires a “finding [of] prejudice to another party from the loss of the information,” and 
here, the “missing” emails were already available to the plaintiff. Finally, the defendant 
argued that there was no intent to deprive the plaintiff of any evidence, as the recovered 
emails were deleted as part of “routine housekeeping.” The court agreed with the 
defendant, and denied the plaintiff’s Motion in Limine, stating that the plaintiff “failed to 
prove that the other . . . documents ever existed.” [KO] 
 
 
• Sunderland v. Suffolk Cty., 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77212 (E.D.N.Y. June 14, 2016). 
(Personal computer, Rule 26(b)(1), email, undue burden, relevance, documents) 
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 NOTE:  Personal computers and email accounts 
In this civil rights case, the plaintiff motioned the court to compel the defendants “to 
search for and produce certain documents from their personal computers and email 
accounts.” The defendants argued that while their electronic work devices and accounts 
can be searched, their personal items are not discoverable. The court granted the 
plaintiff’s motion to compel, explaining that the personal documents are relevant under 
FRCP 26(b)(1), even after the December 2015 amendments. The court elaborated that the 
nature of the case made it likely that relevant information would have been kept on a 
personal device or account rather than a work one. In its reasoning, the court further 
explained that such a search is not overly burdensome because the parties already agreed 
to the terms to be used, the searches had a limited temporal scope, and the plaintiff 
insisted that the defendants’ computers would not have to undergo forensic inspection. 
[KO] 
• Mathew Enter. v. Chrysler Grp. LLC, No. 13-cv-04236-BLF, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
67561 (N.D. Cal. May 23, 2016). 
(Sanctions, spoliation, preservation, email, Rule 37(e)) 
 
In this price discrimination case, the plaintiff’s internal and external emails concerning its 
dealership business practices were irretrievable because the plaintiff made no effort to 
preserve documents. After threatening the defendant with litigation, the plaintiff not only 
switched email systems, but also failed to notify its database vendor of the potential for 
litigation. Emails continued to be deleted regularly per normal business practices. The 
defendant motioned for sanctions against the plaintiff for the loss of these 
communications, stating that there was no effort made to preserve and urged the court to 
utilize spoliation sanctions. The judge, Magistrate Judge Paul Grewal, issued FRCP 37(e) 
sanctions by expanding the scope of evidence the defendant is allowed to bring to trial 
and awarding reasonable attorney’s fees. “[Plaintiff’s] lackadaisical attitude towards 
document preservation took away that opportunity. Not only has spoliation occurred, but 
it also has prejudiced [defendant].” [KO] 
 
• Matthew Enter. v. Chrysler Grp., 2015 WL 8482256 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 10, 2015). 
(Motion to compel, personal email) 
 
NOTE:  Personal email accounts.  
 
In this case, the defendant moved to compel additional ESI, including emails from 
employees’ corporate Gmail accounts and financial documents. The plaintiff did not 
provide all of its employees with a company email account, and many used their personal 
email accounts for business. The plaintiff argued that it could not comply with the 
defendant’s motion because those accounts were not in its “possession, custody, or 
control” and were thus outside the scope of discovery. The defendant argued that the 
plaintiff’s employee handbook “instructs employees to keep ‘internal information’ in the 
‘sole possession’” of the plaintiff’s business. The court rejected the defendant’s 
argument, holding that the handbook was not a contract and did not create a “legal right” 
for the plaintiff to “take back any such information now stored in personal accounts.” The 
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court also concluded that the defendant had not identified any authority by which the 
plaintiff could force its employees to produce the desired emails. Therefore, the court 
denied the motion in part as to the personal email accounts, although it granted it in part 
as to the plaintiff’s vendor-maintained database. [KO] 
 
• Brown Jordan Int’l, Inc. v. Carmicle, Nos. 0:14-CV-60629, 0:14-CV-61415, 2016 WL 
815827 (Mar. 2, 2016). 
(ESI, spoliation, personal device, emails, alteration of metadata) 
 
Upon determining that “applying the new version of Rule 37(e) would be neither unjust 
nor impractical,” the court found that Defendant failed to take reasonable steps to 
preserve the information at-issue, despite a duty to do so; that the lost information could 
not be restored or replaced through additional discovery; and that Defendant acted with 
the intent to deprive Plaintiffs of the information's use in the litigation. Accordingly, the 
court presumed that the lost information was unfavorable to the defendant. Specifically, 
Defendant's spoliation included the remote wiping of his company-owned laptop, the 
alleged loss of his personal iPad, and the accessing of 2.4 million files on his personal 
laptop, thus changing the metadata prior to forensic examination, among other things. 
[KLG] 
 
• CAT3 LLC v. Black Lineage, Inc, No. 14 Civ. 5511 (AT) (JCF), 2016 WL 154116 
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 12, 2016).  
(Email) 
 
Court found “clear and convincing” evidence that Plaintiffs had manipulated emails to 
gain an advantage in the litigation where Defendants’ forensic analyst found the original 
versions of emails that had been altered and then deleted and imposed recently amended 
Rule 37(e) upon determining that the original emails had been “lost” and could not be 
“restored or replaced” because the “fact that there [were] near-duplicate emails showing 
different addresses casts doubt on the authenticity of both”; applying Rule 37(e) court 
determined that subsection (e)(2) applied because of the intentional nature of the 
manipulation but, noting the enumerated sanctions were not mandatory, instead precluded 
Plaintiff from relying upon “their version” of the emails to establish certain elements of 
their claim and imposed payment of reasonable attorney’s fees incurred by Defendants; 
notably, court’s analysis also concluded that sanctions would also be available under the 
court’s inherent authority to impose sanctions for bad faith spoliation. [KLG] 
 
• Agility Pub. Warehousing Co. v. Dep’t of Defense, 14-1064 (JDB), 2017 WL 1214424 
(D.D.C. Mar. 30, 2017). 
(Email) 
 
Where Plaintiff sought sanctions for a government agency’s failure to preserve and 
produce emails in response to a Touhy request (an APA action was eventually filed), 
court denied Plaintiff’s request to depose the Agency’s attorneys as a way to “replace” 
the lost information (thus, according to Plaintiff, avoiding further analysis under Rule 
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37(e)), reasoning that the rule’s Committee Notes appeared to “contemplate that the 
‘replacement’ of lost information would come from another electronic source,” and 
declined to impose the requested sanction under any authority (either Rule 37(e) or the 
court’s inherent authority) where Plaintiff’s requested sanction was not appropriately 
targeted to the harm claimed and where no prejudice was established. [KLG] 
 
• Edelson v Cheung, No. 2:13-cv-5870 (JLL)(JAD), 2017 WL 150241 (D.N.J. Jan. 12, 
2017). 
(Email) 
Where Plaintiff sought spoliation sanctions for Defendant’s deletion of emails and argued 
that Defendant intended to keep the at-issue account hidden and deleted emails after it 
was discovered through another party’s production and that those emails revealed 
Defendant’s intent to keep the at-issue account hidden and other elements of Plaintiff’s 
claims, the court found that the deletions were “intended to deprive Plaintiff of the 
information” contained within and reasoned that Defendant’s claim that he deleted the 
emails because of computer performance lacked credibility, but declined to impose 
default judgment absent a sufficient degree of prejudice and instead ordered that a 
permissive adverse inference instruction would be given to the jury. [KLG] 
 
• Omnigen Research v. Wang, No. 6:16-cv-00268-MC, 2017 WL 2260071 (D. Or. May 23, 
2017).  
(Email, metadata, other ESI) 
For egregious intentional spoliation of ESI, including deletion of emails and metadata 
and donating a relevant computer to charity despite repeated requests for preservation, a 
preliminary injunction and court orders to produce ESI, the court imposed default 
judgment pursuant to FRCP 37(b)(2), FRCP 37(e) and the court’s inherent authority. 
[KLG] 
• Snider v. Danfoss, LLC, 15 CV 4748, 2017 WL 2973464 (N.D. Ill. July 12, 2017). 
(Email) 
 
In this case, the court addressed Plaintiff’s request for sanctions for Defendant’s failure to 
preserve emails and, concluding the information did “not appear to be relevant” and that 
Plaintiff was not prejudiced, denied Plaintiff’s motion for sanctions. [KLG] 
 
• See also Cohn v. Guaranteed Rate, Inc., No. 1:14-cv-9369, 2016 WL 7157358 (N.D. Ill. 
Dec 8, 2016), supra, Section B.  
(Emails - Gmail, but also LinkedIn) 
 
• See also Dave Stafford, Krieg DeVault Seeks Private Emails of Ex-Partners Who Sued 
for Owed Compensation.  The Indiana Lawyer, Aug. 29. 2017.  NOTE:  Requesting 
private emails.   
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D. Video Surveillance (Private and Public) 
• Abdulahi v. Wal-Mart Stores E., L.P., 76 F. Supp. 3d 1393 (N.D. Ga. Dec. 2014). 
(Video surveillance footage) 
 
Where plaintiff was fired for failure to lock a gate—which he disputed—during the 
pendency of separate EEOC investigations into plaintiff’s charges of discrimination and 
where the at-issue manager claimed to have viewed footage confirming the gate was 
unlocked but failed to preserve it, the court determined that Defendant was under a duty 
to preserve (“due to an ongoing EEOC investigation during the applicable time period, 
Wal-Mart’s own investigation into the alleged employee misconduct including a review 
of the video footage, and litigation being reasonably foreseeable”), that plaintiff was 
prejudiced by the loss because neither the at-issue manager’s testimony or emails were 
equivalents for the video, and that plaintiff showed “more than mere negligence” in the 
destruction, the court ordered an adverse inference creating a presumption that “Wal-
Mart’s stated reason for terminating Plaintiff was pre-textual and that retaliation was the 
but-for cause of Plaintiff’s termination” and awarded attorney’s fees. [KLG] 
 
• Ballard v. Williams, No. 3:10-cv-01456, 2015 WL 179071 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 14, 2015). 
(Surveillance video) 
 
Where surveillance footage of hallway in which alleged assault occurred was overwritten, 
the court reasoned there was no indication that the evidence was intentionally lost or 
destroyed, that the named defendants were not responsible for the video system, and that 
defendant was not “materially prejudiced” because he could still testify as to what 
happened and therefore denied the motion for sanctions. [KLG] 
 
• Bloom v. Toliver, No. 12-CV-169-JED-FHM, 2015 WL 5344360 (N.D. Okla. Sept. 14, 
2015). 
(Video surveillance footage and call recording) 
 
Where prisoner alleged that he was attacked by another inmate and that corrections 
officers failed to properly respond, court found prison had a duty to preserve relevant 
surveillance footage and the recording of the involved-officer’s phone call to his wife 
immediately following the incident and that the failure to do so resulted in prejudice; 
court ordered evidentiary sanctions for the loss of certain footage, but reserved a 
determination re: sanctions as to lost video of the aftermath of the attack and the officer’s 
phone call. [KLG] 
 
• Amtrak v. Guy M. Turner, Inc., NO. 4:15-CV-68-BO, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61073 
(E.D.N.C. May 9, 2016). 
(ESI, Discovery, Relevance, Video Data, Rule 26(b)(1)) 
 
In this personal injury case, the plaintiffs brought a suit against the owner of a tractor-
trailer after a non-fatal collision between a passenger train and the vehicle. The defendant 
moved to compel responses to twenty-eight discovery requests, including video footage 
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and locomotive data captured before the incident. The plaintiffs, citing FRCP 26(b)(1), 
argued that the relevant materials had already been provided, and that these requests were 
overly broad and irrelevant. The court joined the widely held view that the 2015 FRCP 
amendments encouraged courts to take an active role in the discovery process, by 
considering each request in turn and weighing it for relevancy. The court then granted 
parts of the defendant’s motion for the additional video and locomotive data. The court 
noted that while the defendant articulated why the requested information was relevant, 
the plaintiff “has failed to demonstrate grounds on which to deny the request.” [KO] 
 
 
• Brown v. Albertsons, LLC, 2:16-cv-01991-JAD-PAL, 2017 WL 1957571 (D. Nev. May 
10, 2017). 
(ESI, including video) 
In response to Plaintiff’s Motion for Spoliation Sanctions, the Court engaged in an 
analysis of four types of available sanctions: Evidentiary, Monetary, Dispositive and 
Adverse Inference Instructions. The Plaintiff argued the Defendant intentionally 
destroyed evidence in the form of an incident report, a surveillance video and 
correspondence between Defendant and a third-party claims adjuster. The Court found 
that information from the incident report and the lost emails with the claims adjuster were 
available elsewhere and that the loss of the video surveillance was due to a system-wide 
outage that affected several stores. The Court found no evidence that Defendant acted 
intentionally or recklessly and denied Plaintiff’s request for Dispositive Sanctions but 
instead imposed lesser Evidentiary Sanctions by allowing the Plaintiff to introduce 
evidence that the incident report was lost or destroyed, that the Defendant failed to 
preserve the third-party communications and that Defendant’s video system failed to 
record the incident. [KLG] 
 
• Patrick v. Tractor Supply, Co., No. 16-10755, 2017 WL 396301 (E.D. La. Jan. 30, 2017). 
(Video surveillance footage) 
Where Defendant had a duty to preserve evidence relevant to the litigation and the video 
in question was found to be relevant, court indicated the “thrust” of its analysis would 
focus on whether the destruction occurred in bad faith and reasoned that Plaintiff’s 
request for preservation of “all video footage of the incident” did not indicate a request 
for footage of the surrounding area, thus allowing the destruction of the video prior to 
filing of the lawsuit, and that the failure to retain the footage was “not the result of a 
directed action to delete the information but rather a failure to stop the automatic 
deletion” which “at best amounts to negligence and does not rise to the level of bad faith” 
and denied Plaintiff’s motion for sanctions but indicated that the parties would be 
allowed to “admit evidence of these issues during trial.” [KLG] 
 
• Storey v. Effingham Cnty., No. CV 415-149, 2017 WL 2623775 (S.D. Ga. June 16, 2017). 
(Surveillance footage from jail) 
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For Defendants’ negligent (or even reckless) failure to preserve relevant video footage 
following Plaintiff’s release from jail despite the “distinct possibility” of litigation in light 
of the injuries Plaintiff suffered while in custody and his specific threats to sue, the court 
imposed sanctions to redress the prejudice to Plaintiff and ordered that the court would 
tell the jury that the video was not preserved and that the parties could present evidence 
and argument regarding that failure for the jury’s consideration. [KLG] 
• Houston v. Coveny, No. 14-cv-6609, 2017 WL 972124 (W.D.N.Y. Mar. 13, 2017). 
(Audio and video recordings) 
Court granted motion for preservation order as to relevant audio and video recordings 
reasoning that a court “may grant a preservation order if a party can demonstrate that the 
evidence is in some danger of being destroyed absent court intervention” and that in light 
of the Department of Corrections and Community Supervision retention policy such an 
order was appropriate to ensure preservation through the pendency of the case. [KLG] 
• Charles v. City of New York, No. 12-CV-6180 (SLT)(SMG), 2017 WL 530460 
(E.D.N.Y., Feb. 8, 2017). 
(Lost phone containing video footage of incident leading to arrest – NOTE:  personal 
device) 
 
Where Plaintiff lost the phone containing relevant video footage of the incident leading to 
plaintiff’s arrest when she attended a “gala” carrying a “really small purse” and thus had 
to hand-carry or lay down her phone and where she failed to call the banquet hall to 
determine if her phone was recovered (although she apparently did call her phone’s 
service provider and a relevant cab company in furtherance of her recovery efforts), the 
court declined to find that the loss was intentional and reasoned that the evidence 
suggested “at most mere negligence” and that because there was a “genuine issue of 
material fact regarding what transpired during the videotaping, the court [could] not find 
that the lost videotape was likely to favor Defendants” and thus denied the motion for 
sanctions without prejudice to renewal at trial if “Defendants could adduce evidence … 
that the lost video recording was likely to be favorable to them”; notably, court applied 
common law spoliation analysis for loss of the phone, recognizing that the common law 
applied, “except in cases involving electronically stored information.” [KLG] 
• Harleysville Ins. Co. v. Holding Funeral Home, Inc., 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18714 
(W.D. Va. Feb. 9, 2017). 
(Video) 
 
In this arson insurance fraud claim, the plaintiff moved the court to disqualify the 
defendant’s counsel for violating the attorney-client privilege and work-product doctrine. 
For the purpose of sharing information electronically, a senior investigator for the 
plaintiff’s parent company uploaded surveillance video footage to a shared file site, and 
sent an email to the National Insurance Crime Bureau (“NICB”). The email contained a 
URL link to the video, along with a standard confidentiality disclosure. Several months 
later, the plaintiff uploaded all claim and investigation files to the same site, and sent the 
same URL link to plaintiff’s counsel. The uploaded files were not password protected, 
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and the plaintiff later conceded that “any person who had access to the internet could 
have accessed the [site] simply by typing in the URL address in a web browser.” In 
response to a subpoena, the NICB sent the defendant a copy of the email containing the 
link, which defense counsel accessed and downloaded. The defendant argued that the 
plaintiff waived its privilege by placing the information on a site with open access. 
Applying state law to the privilege doctrine, the court considered the “reasonableness of 
the precautions to prevent inadvertent disclosures,” the “time taken to rectify the error” 
and the “extent of the disclosure,” and found that the attorney-client privilege was 
waived. The court called the plaintiff’s disclosure “vast”, likening it to “the cyber world 
equivalent of leaving its claims file on a bench in the public square and telling its counsel 
where they could find it.” Likewise, the court held that the plaintiff also waived work-
product doctrine protection under Federal Rule of Evidence 502. The court reasoned that 
the plaintiff’s disclosures were not inadvertent, as the action of posting the information 
online was not unintentional. Additionally, the plaintiff knew the information was not 
protected, and “did not take reasonable steps to prevent its disclosure or to rectify the 
situation.” The court also advised that under public policy, it is the responsibility of 
businesses who choose to use evolving technology to know how to use it and to ensure 
confidential information cannot be accessed by anyone not entitled to view it. [KO] 
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E. Computerized Versions of Contracts and Other Documents 
 One of the major reasons to request all electronically stored information (ESI) is in native 
format with the metadata intact.  As opposed to a paper-based world, where only the final, signed 
version of a contract or other document would likely be available, in the electronic world, a 
multiplicity of drafts and versions might exist, all of which could go to who was involved in the 
process of preparing a document, what changes were made and when and how much time was 
spent.  The prevalence of using Track Changes, particularly with contracts, means that there will 
be a long list of revisions revealing important facets of a dispute, such as intent, chronology of 
events and timing, parties participating, etc.  It is very easy to compare various versions of a 
document side-by-side, including in Word using its Compare feature.   
 
• Columbia Valley Reg'l Med. Ctr. v. Bannert, 112 S.W. 3d 193 (Tex. App. 2003). 
(Word document) – older case, but still interesting 
 
Reversing jury verdict of over $1.5 million in compensatory and punitive damages, court 
found evidence not legally sufficient to support finding that manager authored offending 
memorandum; computer experts testified regarding creation of memo, history of 
revisions and locations of copies. [KLG] 
 
• Iridex Corp. v. Synergetics, Inc., 2007 WL 781254 (E.D. Mo. Mar 12, 2007). 
(Email and draft expert reports) 
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Where defense expert witnesses testified that defense counsel prepared the first drafts of 
reports, and revisions and changes were often exchanged through email, and plaintiff 
contended that it could not tell whether all drafts were produced, nor could it tell who 
created and/or revised each draft, court ordered defendant to produce copies of all drafts 
of all expert opinions, together with all communications between defendant’s employees 
or counsel and expert witnesses regarding the drafts; court further ordered defendant to 
provide a declaration of counsel confirming full production and explaining the 
chronology of the revisions and the author of each set of revisions; declaration would be 
binding on defendant and could be used for cross-examination of expert witnesses. 
[KLG] 
 
• E.E.O.C. v. Forge Ind. Staffing, Inc., No. 1:14-mc-00090-SEB-MJD, 2014 WL 6673574 
(S.D. Ind. Nov. 24, 2014). – NOTE:  Indiana case. 
(Versions of employment application form used by staffing agency between January 1, 
2012 and May 31, 2014, including all pages of and revisions to each form) 
 
Where former employee filed claim with EEOC alleging sexual harassment and 
retaliation, and EEOC issued a subpoena to employer staffing agency seeking 
information to determine how long the staffing agency had required applicants to waive 
statutorily protected statutes of limitations, court declined to enforce the subpoena, 
finding that the EEOC's subpoena exceeded its authority in that the information sought 
went beyond the issues arising out of former employee’s individual charge; court further 
determined that the burden imposed on the staffing agency far exceeded the minimal 
relevance of the evidence sought, given that staffing agency processed 130,000 
temporary employee applications during the time period covered by the subpoena, 
applications were not kept in a central repository or electronically, and compliance would 
require manual review of each employment application maintained in paper format at 
each of its ten office locations and would disrupt agency's day-to-day operations. [KLG] 
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F. Text Messages and Voicemail (see also Section I, infra) 
• Bailey v. Scoutware, LLC, No. 12-10281, 2014 WL 1118372 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 21, 2014). 
(Text messages and voicemail messages on cell phone of plaintiff's former co-worker). 
Because defendant was able to examine the subject cell phone with its expert, court ruled 
that plaintiff should also have the ability to examine the phone to determine if additional 
relevant text or voicemail messages exist or if there is evidence that text or voicemail 
messages were deleted, and ordered defendant to produce the current and old cell phones 
to plaintiff's expert; court deferred ruling on other requested sanctions as premature and 
found that neither side was entitled to attorneys' fees in connection with the motion. 
[KLG] 
• Cochran v. Caldera Med., Inc., No. 12-5109, 2014 WL 1608664 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 22, 
2014). (ESI, text messages, voicemail messages) 
 
In case where defendant represented that it was currently defending approximately 1,709 claims 
nationwide involving its various products, and that it had limited financial resources, 
court denied defendant's request that plaintiffs share in the cost of producing documents 
and ESI as defendant did not demonstrate that ESI sought by plaintiffs was inaccessible; 
court further noted that, given the importance of the discovery requests to plaintiffs' 
ability to prove their claims, and the seriousness of the injuries alleged by plaintiffs, the 
burden or expense of the discovery requests was outweighed by the likely benefit to 
plaintiffs. [KLG] 
 
• Superior Performers Inc. v. Meaike, No. 1:13CV1149, 2015 WL 471429 (M.D.N.C. Feb. 
4, 2015). 
(Voicemail) 
Where Plaintiff’s agent deleted an original voicemail from his phone by way of a factory 
reset but had produced a copy and also claimed to have transferred the voicemail to his 
new phone and where Defendants sought sanctions and argued that the deletion would 
prevent them from showing the voicemail was fabricated, as they suspected, the court 
declined to impose sanctions for the alleged fabrication, despite evidence the presentation 
of evidence that could lead to that conclusion, but did order that Plaintiff be prevented 
from using the voicemail at trial as a sanction for spoliation, reasoning that although the 
voicemail was not on one of Plaintiff’s phones (but rather on its agent’s), it “likely” had a 
duty to preserve the evidence and that Plaintiff did not attempt to provide access to the 
phone or provide notice of the voicemail’s possible destruction. [KLG] 
• Nuvasive v. Madsen Med., 2016 WL 305096 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 26, 2016). 
(Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(e), text messages, spoliation, sanctions, adverse inferences) 
 
In this case, the court granted the plaintiff’s motion to vacate a prior order that imposed 
an adverse inference for the plaintiff’s failure to preserve text messages. Prior to the 2015 
amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the court had granted the 
defendant’s motion for sanctions against the plaintiff for spoliation of evidence. Citing 
the recent amendments to Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(e), the plaintiff argued that that the rule now 
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permits an adverse inference for failure to preserve ESI “only upon the finding that the 
[spoliating] party acted with the intent to deprive another party of the information’s use in 
the litigation.” Citing the new rule, the court agreed that it would be improper to give the 
adverse instruction given that there was no evidence to suggest that the failure to preserve 
was intentional. The court also addressed the timing of the amended rules in context of 
the case, stating that “[g]enerally a new procedural rule applies to the uncompleted 
portions of suits pending when the rule became effective.” Since the trial had not yet 
taken place and the court had not given the adverse inference, the court concluded that 
the “new rule applies to the trial proceedings.” [KO] 
 
• For another case on voicemail, see Margolis v. Dial Corp., infra.   
(Voicemail, instant messages, backup tapes) 
 
• See also Zamora v. Stellar Mgmt. Grp., Inc., 3:16-05028-CV-RK, 2017 WL 1362688 
(W.D. Mo., Mar. 11, 2017), supra, Section B.  
(ESI from cellular phones, Facebook) 
 
• Montgomery v. Iron Rooster-Annapolis, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71338 (D. Md. May 9, 
2017). 
(Text messages)  
 
In this case, the plaintiff alleged that her rights under the Fair Labor Standards Act and 
the Maryland Wage and Hour Law were violated when working for the defendants’ 
restaurant. The defendants contend that the plaintiff was exempt for a large part of her 
employment due to the managerial nature of her position. During the time the defendants’ 
claim the plaintiff was exempt, the plaintiff used an HTC cell phone from Verizon. The 
defendants believed the phone contained text messages between her and other employees, 
which would show she was acting as a manager, as well as text messages to her former 
supervisor who brought a similar claim against the restaurant. The plaintiff claimed that 
she began having problems with her phone around August 15, 2016 and brought the 
phone into the Verizon store. The plaintiff opted to participate in a trade-in program in 
which she would receive $200 for returning her phone to Verizon when a shipping box 
arrived. The shipping box took longer than expected to arrive, the plaintiff ultimately 
shipped the phone back at some point in September 2016, and the account was credited 
with the $200 on October 4, 2016. Both parties agree that the plaintiff was on notice of 
litigation as early as May 4, 2016 and on June 23, 2016 the plaintiff, through counsel, 
threatened the defendants with criminal action and requested they preserve all electronic 
information. The defendants filed a motion to compel sanctions, citing FRCP 37(e), for 
the plaintiff’s failure to preserve the cell phone data. The magistrate judge found that 
there was no intent behind the plaintiff’s failure to preserve the ESI and noted the 
defendant’s counsel had yet to try to retrieve the sought after ESI from other employees. 
As a result, the magistrate judge recommended that jury instructions be provided that 
there was a duty to maintain the ESI on the HTC cell phone and that there should be 
consideration of whether the defendants can prove the phone contained text messages 
during the relevant time period and whether there is any evidence that proves text 
messages on the HTC phone would be favorable to the defendants. [KO] 
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• Tingle v. Hebert, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88936 (M.D. La. June 8, 2017). 
(Email, text messages, personal cell phone and employer-issued cell phone) 
In this wrongful termination case, the defendant brought a motion to compel, requesting 
that the plaintiff produce email and text messages sent or received on his personal cell 
phone and through his personal email accounts, as well as information that the plaintiff 
deleted from his employer-issued cell phone prior to returning it to his employer. The 
court found that while the defendant’s requests for “all text messages” and “all e-mail 
messages” were not proportional to the needs to the case, communications on the 
plaintiff’s personal cell phone were potentially relevant in this case. As such, the court 
limited the scope of discovery on the plaintiff’s personal phone and email accounts to the 
pertinent time period giving rise to the issues in this case, protecting confidential 
information via a protective order. Additionally, the court found that the defendant’s 
requests for deleted information on the plaintiff’s company issued phone appeared to be a 
“fishing expedition”. The court pointed to the plaintiff’s deposition where he stated that 
he deleted private information from the company phone such as communication between 
family members and banking information. The plaintiff stated that he did not delete any 
communications between himself and former co-workers. As such, the court found that 
the defendant’s requests for deleted data would produce irrelevant information. However, 
the court did order the production of communications deleted by the plaintiff on his 
employer-issued cell phone that were exchanged with former co-workers during the 
pertinent time period and referencing the issues in the case. [KO] 
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G. Chats and Instant Messages 
• Ballai v. Kiewit Power Constructors, Co., No. 110166, 2015 WL 423795 (Kan. Ct. App. 
Jan. 23, 2015). 
(Laptop; chat log) 
 
Court of Appeals of Kansas found no abuse of discretion by the district court for failing 
to order sanctions related to the recycling of the laptop computer used by appellant during 
his employment, as the district court did not issue an order to preserve and there is no 
statutory or common-law duty to preserve evidence in Kansas; court further found no 
abuse of discretion by the district court for excluding evidence of recycling the computer; 
court also found that a chat log was relevant, material, and probative and the appellant 
was protected from prejudice because the district court only allowed the redacted version 
of the chat log into evidence. [KLG] 
 
• United States v. Shah, No. 5:13-CR-328-FL, 2015 WL 3605077 (E.D.N.C. June 5, 2015).   
(Gmail emails and chats) 
 
Court declined to find that contents of email and chats from gmail account could be 
authenticated as Google’s business records pursuant to ER 902(11) where the contents of 
the emails were automatically copied to and maintained upon Google’s servers finding 
that the “knowledge” requirement was not satisfied and reasoning: “Neither 
SHAHNN28@GMAIL.COM, nor any other originating source whose statements appear 
in the records produced by Google were under a “business duty” to convey accurate 
information in their correspondence. Because the proffered “finished product” is not the 
collective effort of “business insiders,” who share a duty to ensure the accuracy of their 
statements, the court cannot allow those statements to be authenticated on the theory that 
they are Google’s self-proving business records under Federal Rules of Evidence 803(6) 
and 902(11).” [KLG] 
 
• Day v. LSI Corp., No. CIV 11-186-TUC-CKJ, 2012 WL 6674434 (D. Ariz. Dec. 20, 
2012). 
(Emails, instant messages, miscellaneous ESI) 
Where plaintiff sought sanctions for spoliation, including the loss of documents 
belonging to a particularly relevant custodian, the court focused in particular on the 
failures of General Counsel (who the court found “knew or should have known” that the 
custodian’s documents were relevant to the action and thus “at least acted willfully” in 
failing to preserve) and defendant’s failure to follow its own document retention policies 
and granted partial default judgment as to one claim for which the risk of prejudice was 
“great” but awarded an adverse inference as to the other claims where the risk of 
prejudice was less and also awarded monetary sanctions. [KLG] 
• Doe v. City of San Diego, No. 12-cv-0689-MMA (DHB), 2013 WL 2338713 (S.D. Cal. 
May 28, 2013). 
(Cellular phone records, including content) 
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Court found plaintiff had standing to challenge city’s subpoena to Verizon Wireless 
seeking “any and all records” for Plaintiff’s cellular phone, including texts, instant 
messages, etc. and found that Verizon was prohibited from disclosing such content by the 
Federal Stored Communications Act; Verizon was also prohibited from disclosing non-
content records where such disclosure to a “governmental agency” is prohibited; court 
noted that alternative methods for discovery were available and specifically noted the 
availability of a Rule 34 request for production. [KLG] 
• Lakes Gas Co. v. Clark Oil Trading Co., 875 F. Supp. 2d 1289 (D. Kan. June 21, 2012).  
(Email and/or instant messages) 
 
In a brief discussion of spoliation, the court denied defendant’s motion for sanctions 
where, despite the fact that it “seemed clear that there was some loss of evidence … in 
the form of email and/or ‘instant messages’ … at a time [Plaintiff] knew litigation was 
imminent,” the evidence suggested that the loss was inadvertent, there was no claim of 
bad faith or evidence to support such a finding, defendant’s claims of prejudice were 
largely speculative and defendant did not aggressively pursue the issue of spoliation; 
court’s analysis stated that “in these circumstances” (referencing apparent inadvertence of 
the loss and lack of a claim of bad faith), “the court looks to the culpability of those 
involved and the relevance of the proof to the issues at hand”. [KLG] 
 
• Margolis v. Dial Corp., No. 12-CV-0288-JLS (WVG), 2012 WL 2588704 (S.D. Cal. July 
3, 2012). 
(Voicemail, instant messages, backup tapes) 
 
Court denied Plaintiffs’ request for a preservation order as to voicemail and instant 
messages where defendants had already sent litigation hold notices requiring preservation 
such that Plaintiffs’ request was moot; Court further declined to enter preservation order 
as to backup tapes where defendants established that their preservation would impose a 
significant burden and that the contents were likely duplicative and where the court found 
that the backup tapes did not fall within the exception identified in Zubulake v UBS 
Warburg, 220 FRD 212 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). [KLG] 
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H. YouTube and Vine 
• Teller v. Dogge, No. 2:12-cv-00591-JCM-GWF, 2013 WL 5655984 (D. Nev. Oct. 16, 
2013).  
(Videos defendant posted to YouTube, instructional DVD and manual) 
 
Where defendant failed to produce subject videos or make his hard drive available for 
mirror imaging as required by court's order, but plaintiff ultimately obtained the subject 
videos from Google, court denied plaintiff's request for case-dispositive sanctions but 
would impose an adverse inference instruction in the form of a mandatory presumption in 
light of multiple warnings to defendant that sanctions would result if he did not produce 
the information and in light of other "violative and unmannered conduct" of defendant in 
the litigation. [KLG] 
 
• People v. Torres, No. E052071, 2012 WL 1205808 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 11, 2012). 
(YouTube video) 
 
Trial court did not abuse its discretion in permitting prosecution to show a YouTube 
video where, although officer testified “he did not know when the video was made or 
who produced it” he testified that the video was an accurate depiction of what it looked 
like on YouTube such that the trial court “could conclude that the video would assist 
jurors in determining the facts of the case and motivation for the crimes” and where the 
court determined that the issues of when and who produced the video spoke to issues of 
reliability and weight and that the images on the video (picture of the alleged victim with 
an “x” over his face, for example) coupled with evidence linking defendant to the crime 
of attempted murder “sufficiently link[ed] the video with the defendant”. [KLG] 
 
Vine is described as “[t]he entertainment network where videos and personalities get 
really big, really fast. Download Vine to watch videos, remixes and trends before they blow up.” 
Vine’s website includes its Terms of Service at https://vine.co/terms, its privacy policy at 
https://vine.co/privacy and its rules at https://vine.co/rules.  The status of Vine has evolved in the 
past year.  See Vine (service), Wikipedia, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vine_(service), accessed 
9/29/17. 
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I.Instagram, Pinterest, Snapchat and WhatsApp 
• For a case about Instagram, see Keller v. National Farmers Union Property & Cas. Co., 
supra). 
(Motion to compel, production, social networking, social network, expectation of 
privacy) 
 
• Moulton v. Bane, No. 14-cv-265-JD, 2015 WL 7776892 (S.D.N.H. Dec. 2, 2015). 
(Text messages (WhatsApp)) 
 
Where Defendant unintentionally lost text messages when his service provider failed to 
transfer those text messages to his new phone—despite his request to transfer 
“everything”—and where the texts were later recovered by a forensic analysist, court 
declined to impose “punitive sanctions” and ordered Defendant to pay the cost of 
retrieving the messages. [KLG] 
 
• For a thorough review of the electronic discovery issues with Snapchat, WhatsApp and 
other mobile messaging services, see Cori Faklaris & Sara Anne Hook, Oh, Snap!  The 
State of Electronic Discovery Amid the Rise of Snapchat, WhatsApp, Kik, and Other 
Mobile Messaging Apps, The Federal Lawyer, May 2016, pp. 64-75. 
 
• Roof v. Newcastle Pub. Sch., 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14886 (W.D. Okla., Feb. 8, 2016). 
(Snapchat) 
 
“Plaintiff's asserts that, during the time Feroli was employed as a teacher by the District, 
he engaged in an inappropriate romantic relationship with A.S., plaintiff's minor daughter 
who was then a high school senior. Plaintiff describes the relationship as beginning with 
"snap chatting" and Facetime exchanges, including ones where Feroli would allegedly 
forward pictures to A.S. of himself disrobed and exposing his genitals. Plaintiff's 
evidence is that the relationship progressed to instances of kissing and petting in Feroli's 
classroom when the two were alone.” [Id. at 2.] 
 
• See also U.S. v. Gaston (Instagram), supra.   
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 J. Wearable Devices and the Internet of Things 
• For information on the Internet of Things as a source of evidence, see Sharon D. Nelson 
& John W. Simek, The Internet of Everything:  What It Means for Lawyers, Sensei 
Enterprises, Inc., 2014, https://senseient.com/articles/the-internet-of-everything-what-it-
means-for-lawyers/, accessed 9/29/17. 
 
• For information on fitness trackers and wearable devices as sources of evidence, see 
Marilyn Odehdahl, Fitness Trackers Add to Flood of Digital Evidence in Court. The 
Indiana Lawyer, Aug. 10, 2016. 
 
• Vishakha Kumari & Sara Anne Hook, The Privacy, Security and Discoverability of Data 
on Wearable Health Devices: Fitness or Folly? HCI International 2017, Vancouver, 
Canada, July 12, 2017, https://scholarworks.iupui.edu/handle/1805/13462, accessed 
9/29/17. 
 
• See Marc Salzman, So You’ve Split From Your Fitness Tracker:  Can You Get Your Data 
Back? USA Today, Aug. 6, 2017.  
 
• See Antigone Peyton, A Litigator’s Guide to the Internet of Things.  22. Rich. J.L. & 
Tech. 9 (Mar. 30, 2016).  
 
• Nicola Fabiano, The Internet of Things and the Legal Issues Related to the Data 
Protection Law According to the New European General Data Protection Regulation.  
Athens Journal of Law, July 2017, at 201.  
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K. Even Celebrities Have Issues with E-Discovery – and Issues with New Technology 
• Scott Collins, Deleted Recording Amplifies ‘Bad Blood’ Between Pop Icon, Disc Jockey.  
The Indiana Lawyer, Oct. 4, 2017. (Mueller v. Swift, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 112276 (D. 
Colo. July 19, 2017)). 
• The Duty to Preserve Extends to 3rd Parties and Their Texts (Ronnie Van Zant, Inc. v. 
Artemis Pyle (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 28, 2017)) – see Exterro case summary, 
https://www.exterro.com/case-law-library/new-data-types/ronnie-van-zant-v-artemis-
pyle/, accessed 10/13/17.  
 
• Boston Red Sox Caught Using Apple Watches to Steal Signals from Yankees During 
Games – see Exterro case summary, https://www.exterro.com/blog/boston-red-sox-using-
apple-watches-to-steal-signals-from-yankees/, accessed 10/13/17.  
 
• Text Messages MUST Be Accounted for in E-Discovery – see Exterro case summary, 
https://www.exterro.com/blog/text-messages-must-be-accounted-for-in-e-discovery/, 
accessed 10/13/17.  
 
• Emojis (emoticons) as evidence – see Next Witness: Will The Yellow Smiley Face Take 
The Stand? (NPR, Feb. 8, 2015, http://www.npr.org/2015/02/08/384662409/your-honor-
id-like-to-call-the-smiley-face-to-the-stand, accessed 10/16/17).  See also Mark Walsh, 
Emoijis Head to a Courthouse Near You. ABA Journal, Oct. 2017, at 11.  
 
• Wendy N. Davis, Face Time:  Facial Recognition Technology Helps Nab Criminals – 
and Raises Privacy Concerns.  ABA Journal, Oct. 2017, at 16.  
 
 
 
